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Abstract  
 
We define emotional competence as a person’s domain-specific working model about how one 
can appropriately manage one’s emotions within interpersonal situations. Emotional 
competence is conceived as the integration of seven seemingly unrelated proficiencies: 
perspective taking, strategic self-presentation of emotions, helping targets of communication 
accept one’s genuine emotional reactions, lack of guilt when using emotions strategically, 
fostering self-authenticity, developing an ironic perspective, and incorporating one’s moral 
code into the self-regulation of emotions. A cluster analysis of responses to measures of the 
seven proficiencies by 220 salespeople revealed four distinct groups of people. The groups were 
defined by emotional competence syndromes consisting of combinations of different levels of 
the seven proficiencies. One group, the highly emotional competent, scored high on all seven 
proficiencies, a second group scored low on all seven. Two other groups resulted wherein one 
group was dominated by feelings of guilt in the use of emotions strategically, and the second 
was characterized by the inability to accept ambiguous and contradictory situations by 
assuming an ironic perspective. In a test of predictive validity, the highly emotional competent 
group, but not the others, coped effectively with envy and pride, achieved high social capital, 
and performed well.  
 
Keywords: emotional competence, emotion regulation, coping, social capital and performance 
 
 
 “It is a matter of debate whether all of her [Hillary Clinton’s] moves are deliberate 
calculation on the part of a politician with higher ambitions, or a glimpse at the true 
character of a woman who is finally unbound from the strictures of being a President's 
wife. But whatever the case, it has caused many of her colleagues to re-evaluate her, 
and allowed her to begin building personal capital in a chamber that trades heavily on 
it.” (R. Hernandez, The International Herald Tribune, Friday, January 25, 2002).  
 
Introduction 
Researchers recommend that organizations give more attention to emotional intelligence, 
aptitude for self-regulation, the aptitude for self-regulation of emotions (e.g., Goleman, 2001a, 
Mayer & Salovey, 1997). However, over-emphasis on emotional intelligence can lead to a 
nightmare for the organization. For example, Feldman Barret and Gross (2001, p. 304) argue, 
“One might be positively evil and yet be emotionally intelligent in the sense that one knows how 
to manage one’s emotions so as to further one’s (wicked) ends”. Huy (1999, p. 334) notes 
further that “to the extent that [emotionally intelligent] individuals attempt to use their emotional 
intelligence as private tools to further their self-interests, each might try to outsmart, or rather to 
“out feel”, the other through emotional manipulation. The net result could well be complete 
mistrust, cynicism, or alienation at the organizational level.” The above cautions point to a 
general deficit in the emotional intelligence literature: namely, the concept of emotional 
intelligence fails to specify needed content about people’s goals, that is, whether they “apply 
their talents as con artists or in ways that benefit others” (Saarni, 2000, p. 83).  
Huy (1999) and Saarni (1999) stress that a person’s capacity to experience, manage, and 
direct emotions within social situations should have a sense of appropriateness and purpose. 
“Emotional competence” (Saarni, 1999) and “emotional capability” (Huy, 1999) are concepts 
that precisely capture the notion that individuals and groups manage their emotions purposively, 
in the sense that they express people’s individuality and the capacity to cope with emotionally 
challenging situations, while at the same time behaving in accordance with organizational goals 
and norms. However, little work has been done to operationalize the concepts of emotional 
competence or capability. The objective of this paper is to develop and test a conceptualization 
of emotional competence. Because different functions occur within organizations and require 
different emotional competencies, we develop a domain-specific conceptualization of emotional 
competence that applies specifically for customer boundary spanners.   
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We first define what domain-specific emotional competence is and propose an 
operationalization of 7 components. Next, we apply cluster analysis to segment employees 
according to their pattern of scores on the dimensions of emotional competence.  Finally, we test 
hypotheses concerning how emotional competence affects the way employees cope with positive 
and negative emotions (especially feelings of envy and pride) and how it relates to the 
attainment of social capital and the achievement of performance goals.  
Emotional competence as configurations of emotional skills 
An early aim in the study of emotional competence (Saarni, 1999; 2000) was to explain 
how individuals learn to flexibly apply a set of emotion management skills to their social 
environments (for instance in families, friendships, or schools), such that the person is conceived 
as maintaining their own individuality but at the same time is capable of handling different 
emotionally challenging situations in accordance with the norms of the particular social 
environment. Emotional competence is manifest as a “working self”; that is, a style of “being in 
the world” with different skills that function to regulate emotions. A working self is needed 
because emotion management within social situations (1) is full of uncertainties and ambiguities 
(e.g., it is not possible to find an appropriate and/or universal coping strategy for every situation) 
(Weigert, 1991; Erickson, R.J. 1997) and (2) contains seemingly personal contradictions (e.g., 
one must be able to be authentic in some situations, yet dissemble one’s emotions in other 
situations  (King & Emmons, 1990; Erickson, 1997). To the extent that people achieve an 
emotional working self, they can more fluently handle emotional laden situations and become 
successful and respected members of a social community (Saarni, 1999). If people fail to 
develop coherent selves, they risk becoming a “protean self”, that is, a fragmented, divided self 
which “is radically bereft of coherence and continuity, an extreme expression of dissociation” 
(Lifton, 1993, p. 202; Emmons, 1999, and McAdams, 1988, make similar points). As 
Greenberg, Weinstein, and Sweeney (2001, p. 49) note about salespeople: “As we look at their 
ability to sell, we have to look at how much or how little of each quality they possess and how 
these qualities integrate with the strengths of their other qualities.”  
Drawing upon Saarni’s (1999; 2000) extensive program of research in developmental 
psychology, as well as recent research on self-regulation (e.g., Bonanno, 2001) and moral 
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psychology (e.g., Dillon, 1995), we discern seven emotional proficiencies (developed more fully 
below) that have to be integrated for achieving emotional competence: perspective taking, 
strategic self-presentation of emotions, convincing targets of communication that one’s 
emotional reactions are genuine and not self-serving, lack of guilt when using emotions 
strategically, fostering self-authenticity, developing an ironic perspective, and incorporating 
one’s moral code into the self-regulation of emotions. i Yet, within an organization, emotionally 
competent employees purposively or actively (rather than merely reactively) seek to master and 
integrate these emotional skills such that they can handle typical or routine emotion laden 
situations within their profession. They do this in such a way that they express their own 
individuality (or “personal flavor” as Saarni, 1999, calls it) and also are perceived in their 
actions to be appropriate to organizational, as well as their own, norms and goals (e.g., Erickson, 
1997). For contexts where management cannot prescribe emotional behaviors of their 
employees, people should have the capacity to show emergent emotional behavior (Mumby & 
Putnam, 1992). As people seek to integrate the above mentioned emotional proficiencies, it is to 
be expected that they will achieve integration to different degrees (McAdams, 1988). That is, 
abilities to transcend all the proficiencies or to integrate across polarities will differ across 
people in different situations. People low in their abilities to integrate the emotional 
proficiencies are expected to cope less well with emotional challenging situations than people 
high in their abilities, but the pattern of abilities can differ, depending on the person and 
situation.   
In accordance with the configural approach of organizational behavior (e.g., Meyer, Tsui, 
& Hinings, 1993), the authors conjecture that integration of the seven emotional skills will 
exhibit a small number of distinct pattern (McAdams, 1988; Meyer et al., 1993). To take a 
particular example, the literature suggests that a lack of irony limits people’s ability to grow and 
integrate themselves in complex situations (Hatch, 1997, p. 282). But any one ability in isolation 
should not completely determine emotional competencies that lead to effective adaptation. Our 
goal is to empirically discern the pattern of skills operative in a particular work environment that 
determines effective coping with important motional experience, leads to achievement of high 
social capital, and results in successful performance.  
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McAdams (1988, p. 115) argues that the fullest integration of skills will be achieved only 
by a fraction of people. It seems best then to treat such skills as resources and to propose that 
they combine to define different proficiencies in working selves: the better that people can 
purposively integrate these skills the better they can manage specific emotional challenging 
situations (e.g., Huy, 1999, p. 334; Cantor, 1990; Saarni, 1999). Working selves can also be 
considered to reflect people’s emotional character, in the sense that it refers to people’s ability to 
integrate emotional skills into effective actions (Emmons, 1999). Each situation will call forth 
for particular skills, but not everyone will be equipped to deal with the situation to the same 
degree. Emotional character also “focuses upon the long-term aspect of our emotional 
experience” (Sennett, 1998, p. 10; see also Sabini & Silver, 1998; Saarni, 1999). Finally, 
because emotional competence is a domain-specific construct (Huy, 1999), it should be noted 
that one and the same person can be emotionally competent in one domain (e.g., in customer 
contact) but not in another domain (e.g., managing relations with family members). In our study, 
we focus on one domain, namely how salespeople interact with customers and members of their 
own organization.  
Whereas research on emotions to date has especially focused on how employees adopt and 
execute feeling rules within their organizations and how the implementation of the 
organizations’ feeling rules might give rise to emotional dissonance (Hochschild, 1983) or 
feelings of deviousness and deviance (e.g., Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987), less effort has been devoted 
to the study of how employees integrate multiple, complex skills into a healthy working self 
(Erickson, R.J. 1997) and experience positive emotions as a consequence. Similarly, generativity 
implies a need to develop and grow in an integrated way: “negative feelings are integrated into 
one’s understanding of oneself such that one emerges as more perceptive and emotionally aware 
as a whole person” (Saarni, 2000, p. 80, see also Erikson, E.H., 1963). The ability to integrate 
contradictory emotional skills on the job is similar to the process of job crafting (Wrzesniewski 
& Dutton, 2001) and role innovation (Ashforth, 2001). We use the term “emotional crafting” to 
refer to specific emotion competencies. Emotional crafting thus is the process that people 
undergo to integrate seemingly contradictory emotional skills into a working self, and in the 
process come to achieve a unique signature to their work.    
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Emotional competence also has some similarity to emotional homeostasis in that it reflects 
“reference goals pertaining to ideal frequencies, intensities, or duration of experiential, 
expressive, or physiological channels of emotional responses” (Bonanno, 2001, p. 256). These 
reference goals function as personal principles to guide emotional behavior and are exemplified 
in such virtues as generosity or integrity (e.g., Bonanno, 2001, p. 257).  Thus emotional 
competence can be understood as an ability to create “ideal emotional selves” that guide 
emotional self-regulation (Bonanno, 2001, p. 258) and, as such, is goal-directed or teleonomic. 
Somewhat similar ideas have been proposed by Ibarra (1999; 2000) who conceives of 
membership in an organization as an extending of one’s possible selves through experimenting 
and imitation of role models (see also Pratt, 2000). People who carefully construct their personal 
selves are called “collage observers” and are “more likely to find behaviors that fit who they are, 
who they want to be, and what they can do” (Ibarra, 2000, p. 151). Emotional competence also 
resonates partly with Mumby and Putnam’s (1992) suggestion of a feminist approach to 
emotions in organizations, which argues that social actors do not simply enact feeling rules of 
the organization but rather cope with ambiguity through integrating seemingly contradictory 
emotional skills into bounded emotionality: “Under norms of bounded emotionality, individuals 
choose appropriate organizational actions based on a system of tolerance and ambiguity rather 
than a system of reducing ambiguity through satisficing” (Mumby & Putnam, 1992, p. 474-475).     
Two distinct concepts: Emotional competence and emotional intelligence  
Emotional competence resonates to some extent with different perspectives on emotional 
intelligence (e.g., Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Goleman, 1995; 
1998). Although there is no universally shared definition of emotional intelligence, researchers 
agree that, similar to emotional competence, emotional intelligence refers to abilities to 
recognize and regulate emotions ii. Yet, by placing emotional intelligence into a general model 
of intelligence, Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000) portray emotional intelligence in rather 
broad terms as the ability to perceive and express emotions, to understand and use them, and to 
manage one’s emotions so as to foster personal growth (see also Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Mayer 
& Salovey, 1997). Psychologists maintain as well that emotional intelligence is an innate 
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personality trait iii and is as function of cognitive resources (Feldmann Barrett & Gross , 2001, p. 
294, speak about aspects of working memory in this regard).  
We maintain that on the other hand emotional competence is a capacity or skill that results 
from long-term efforts to integrate disparate emotional skills in ways that enable persons to 
manage their emotions appropriately within an organization. The following distinctions can be 
made in this regard.     
First, emotional competence is domain specific. In this regard, we agree with Huy (1999) 
who insists that emotional capability addresses only emotional issues that are engendered by one 
specific facet of the organization (that is, change at the organizational level). The domain 
specific skills of emotional competence (described more fully below) mirror some of the 
dimensions of Huy’s (1999) concept of emotional capability but are by no means identical.  
Second, emotional competence is learned and emerges from effortful actions over a longer 
period of time. Emotional competence is a function of a person’s aspiration within a particular 
domain. That is, it is teleonomic, oriented towards enduring goals (Allport, 1937). More 
specifically, salespeople who score high in emotional competency seek to fit into their 
organization while at the same time expressing individuality. This results in esteem from 
colleagues and customers and contributes to enhanced performance, as developed below. As 
Saarni (1999, p. 6) notes, people use emotional displays strategically: “depending on whom we 
are with and what we are feeling, we express our emotions with communicative intent.” 
Third, emotional competence does not require emotional intelligence. People with low 
emotional intelligence might achieve emotional competence within a specific domain if 
experience has taught them the requisite skills. In this regard, we agree with Huy (1999) who 
states that emotional intelligence is not a prerequisite for emotional capability. Rather, emotional 
competence and emotional intelligence relate to one another like intelligence does to wisdom, 
the first being a set of innate cognitive abilities, the second being the result of long-term growth 
processes in maturation of the self (cf., Sternberg, 1990; Saarni, 2000). For instance, intelligent 
persons might seek to allocate considerable cognitive effort to solve ambiguity, whereas a wise 
person might be able to see ambiguity as inherent in all interactions and become comfortable 
with it (Sternberg, 1990a). A wise person achieves an integrated personality through resolving 
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contradictions over time by judicious learning following responses to problems. The learning, 
which produces an organized self, entails emotional and cognitive knowledge and is contingent 
on specific situations (Orwoll & Perlmutter, 1990). Pascual-Leone (1990, p. 22) sum this up as 
follows: “Wisdom differs from [creativity and intelligence] in involving not just cognition but 
affect and personality as a whole”.  
Fourth and finally, in contrast to emotional competence, “[emotional intelligence] has 
often been defined without reference to ethical values … or one’s ego identity (e.g., Goleman, 
1995; Mayer & Salovey, 1997)” (Saarni, 2000, p. 82). Yet, within organizations, emotional 
competence helps to build trust and social capital by inducing people to act in harmony with 
commonly accepted moral standards. Emotional competence involves the management of one’s 
emotions in a way that is in accord with one’s moral dispositions (Saarni, 1999, p. 15) as well as 
social norms (Huy, 1999, p. 334). Emotional competence thus reflects one’s ability to develop 
character (e.g., Dweck, 1996; Emmons, 1999; Sabini & Silver, 1998). The concept of emotional 
intelligence fails to address this component of human behavior. Research on moral development 
shows that moral commitment and personal integrity are inextricably linked to one’s social-
emotional experience (e.g., Haan, 1991; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995; Walker & 
Taylor, 1991). Consequently, Saarni (2000) notes that “personal integrity comes with a life lived 
in accord with one’s moral sense or disposition, and concomitantly, such a life reflects 
emotional competence ...[they cannot] be separated from one another ” (p. 72). iv  
In a nutshell, we concur with Saarni who summarizes the main differences between 
emotional intelligence and emotional competence as follows (1999, p. 60): “Where emotional 
competence and emotional intelligence may differ is in emphasis: I consistently focus on 
emotions in social contexts, and with regard to the individual’s self-efficacy and moral sense.”  
It should be acknowledged, however, that Goleman (1995; 1998; 2001a,b) and Bar-On 
(1997; 2000) incorporate social awareness and social skills in their conceptualizations of 
emotional intelligence. To some extent we agree with these authors: emotional competence also 
focuses on the management of one’s emotions in an interpersonal context (Saarni, 1999; 2000). 
On the other hand, emotional competence is more specific than the concept of emotional 
intelligence proposed by Bar-On (2000) and Goleman (1995), who may be criticized for over-
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stretching the concept of emotional intelligence (e.g., Gardner, 1999; Sternberg, 1999; Hedlund 
& Sternberg, 2000). Bar-On (2000) and Goleman (1995, 1998) include social awareness, as well 
as social skills, in emotional intelligence in their attempt “to capture almost everything but IQ” 
(Hedlund & Sternberg, 2000, p. 146). Likewise, as Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (2000, p. 268) 
point out:  
“These alternative conceptions include not only emotion and intelligence 
per se, but also motivation, non-ability dispositions and traits, and global personal 
and social functioning (e.g., Bar-On, 1997; Goleman, 1995). Such broadening 
seems to undercut the utility of the terms under consideration. We call these 
mixed conceptions because they combine together so many diverse ideas. ... 
Mixed models must be analyzed carefully so as to distinguish concepts that are 
part of emotional intelligence from the concepts that are mixed in, or confounded, 
with it.” 
The seven skills of emotional competence 
Based on research in psychological development (Saarni, 1999), emotional self-regulation 
(e.g., Bonanno, 2001), and moral psychology (e.g., Dillon, 1995; Flanagan, 1991; Peck et al., 
1960), we glean seven seemingly contradictory emotional skills that need to be fully integrated 
if people are to achieve emotional competence within their social domain v. We also draw upon 
Spencer and Spencer (1993) who found that successful salespersons integrate such contradictory 
competencies as being assertive and influencing the customer with maintaining a strong 
customer orientation by trying to discover and meet customer’s needs. Similarly, we benefited 
from research on role conflict and role ambiguity in personal selling (e.g., Singh, Verbeke, & 
Rhoads, 1996). Below we define each emotional skill:    
1) Perspective taking is the skill of placing oneself in the place of another. It is a learned 
and a central part of empathy which is defined as “an affective response that stems from the 
apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition, and that is identical 
or very similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel” (Eisenberg, 
2000, p. 677). This ability to feel with others is a key component of emotional competence and 
is responsible for promoting social bonds among sales people (Saarni, 1999; Manstead & 
Edwards, 1992). vi Empathic salespeople are better listeners; they sense the feelings of others, 
accrue a basis for better influencing others, and tend to be better performers (Spiro & Weitz, 
1989; Spencer & Spencer, 1993; Pilling & Eroglu, 1994). Martin, Knopoff, and Beckman 
(2000, p. 116) argue further that “individuals should constrain emotional expression in order to 
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function effectively in interpersonal relationships in ways that are sensitive to other people's 
emotional needs and competencies" (emphasis added).   
2) Managing self-presentations of emotion: a key skill in emotion management is a 
salesperson’s awareness that  expression of his/her emotions affects others and may be 
strategically used to advantage (Saarni, 1999, p. 187). The control of emotional expression can 
be likened to acting and has been called emotional dissemblance because it often involves a 
dissociation between what is felt and what is communicated (Saarni, 1999). In organization 
research, the management of emotion (according to feeling rules) has been termed emotional 
work (e.g., Hochschild, 1983; Mumby & Putnam, 1992; Ashforth & Tomiuk, 2000) or 
impression management (e.g., Schlenker, 1980). Firms expect their salespeople to manage 
their emotional expressions with customers to advantage (e.g., Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988; Morris 
& Feldman, 1996). For instance, salespersons are expected to act in conspicuously enthusiastic 
ways concerning their products even if they are ambivalent towards the products, company, or 
customers (e.g., Ash, 1984). Goleman (2001b, p. 37) notes in this regard that “the most 
effective people sense others’ reactions and fine-tune their own responses to move 
interaction”. 
3) Helping others accept one’s emotions: although an efficient means for managing self-
presentation, emotional dissemblance takes resources (Feldman Barrett & Gross, 2001) and is 
therefore also labeled emotional labor (e.g., Mumby & Putnam, 1992; Morris & Feldman, 
1996). Whereas the display of genuine emotions requires little effort (Leary & Kowalski, 
1990), considerable control is needed to show emotions that differ from what one actually 
feels on an on-going basis. Morris and Feldman (1996, p. 992) note in this respect: “What 
makes regulation of emotional expression more difficult, and thus more labor intensive, are 
exactly those situations in which there are conflicts between genuinely felt emotions and 
organizationally desired emotions.” In addition, particularly during prolonged and continuing 
customer interactions that are common in sales, great efforts are required of the salesperson to 
keep up one’s self-presentation (Morris & Feldman, 1996, p. 990).  Therefore, it is sometimes 
better strategy to help others come to accept one’s emotions instead of trying to change or 
dissemble ones own emotions in every instance.  Effective salespeople not only have the 
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ability to dissemble their own emotions in a strategic way but also to “impose” their genuine 
emotions on others and make other people feel comfortable with them. In this regard, some 
psychologists speak about emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). In 
addition, as a consequence of expressing genuine emotions, the salesperson may influence 
attributions in customers to the effect that one is trustworthy and credible. These attributions 
have been found to be key in job performance in general (Goleman, 2001b) and sales in 
particular (Spencer & Spencer, 1993). 
4) Dissociation of guilt from strategic intent: Skills in the strategic management of 
emotions will come to naught if the communicator counterfactually anticipates self-guilt in 
their use. Parkinson (1991) studied how hairdressers interpret their interaction with customers. 
Hairdressers who felt pleased and proud about their ability to get customers to talk about 
themselves actually produced more satisfying interactions than hairdressers who did not. 
Indeed hairdressers who felt guilty about their ability to get customers to talk about themselves 
produced less satisfying interactions. In this respect, Rafaeli and Sutton implicitly refer to guilt 
as a consequence of emotional regulation when they (1987, p. 32) speak about a “person-role 
conflict, or a clash between personal values and role requirements,” and Hochschild’s (1983) 
concept pf alienation of employees, as a consequence of emotional labor, may as well be 
interpreted as a way of coping with the continuous feelings of guilt that may result from 
emotional labor (i.e., dissembling emotions). It is these negative feelings that pose a threat to 
emotional well-being -- indeed research has identified person-role conflict as a significant 
threat to employee well-being (e.g., Kahn et al., 1964; Caplan et al., 1975). Similarly, King 
and Emmons (1990) argue that ambivalence of emotional expression is related to guilt, which 
by consuming people’s resources may lead to job stress and burnout (Cordes & Dougherty, 
1993). In short, salespeople, who are able to avoid guilt or feel less guilty about their 
emotional expression or who have been able to overcome their negative feelings, should feel 
more satisfied and relaxed -- and hence be more effective -- than salespeople who feel guilty 
when contemplating the use of emotions as a strategic tool. 
5) Feelings of authenticity: R.J. Erickson (1997) notes that we live in a “therapeutic 
emotional culture” where the process of emotional management is considered normal, an 
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assumption that seems to be appropriate at least for the domain of sales and service 
professions, which are largely dominated by organizational feeling rules or communications 
tactics developed to facilitate persuasion (e.g., Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Morris & Feldman, 
1996). Yet, such a view allows people to engage in emotional management in ways that are 
consistent with well-being and authenticity: “such a reconceptualization makes it possible to 
view emotion management as a “normal” part of emotional experience. If so, then it is 
possible that managed emotion is potentially as real or authentic a part of emotional 
experience as spontaneously felt emotion” (Erickson, R.J. 1997, p. 7). This argument is 
supported by research on the effects of emotion management within work contexts (e.g., 
Adelmann, 1995; Bulan, Erickson, & Wharton, 1997; Leidner, 1993). As a consequence, 
salespersons that are able to assume such a perspective on emotion management might be able 
to combine strategic intent and use of displayed emotions with feelings of authenticity, even if 
acting strategically. Thus, Ashforth and Tomiuk (2000, p. 190) note that about half of the 
persons in their study on service professions “simulated a wide range of emotions ... and yet 
continued to feel authentic in the role”. That is, such salespeople were able to adopt a persona 
of caring to perform their roles yet maintain their authentic selves.  
6) An ironic perspective: Hatch (1997, p. 281) suggests that irony is achieved through the 
willingness to let go of conventional ways of viewing experience, and to try on new 
vocabularies and interpretive routines. Citing Rorty (1989, p. 74), Hatch (1997) suggests that 
ironists are people who “realize that anything can be made to look good or bad by being 
redescribed, and their renunciation of the attempt to formulate criteria of choice ... puts them 
in the position which Sartre called “meta-stable”: never quite able to take themselves seriously 
because they are always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to 
change.” Similarly, irony serves as a mechanism that should allow salespeople to tolerate 
emotionally ambiguous situations and apply at times contradictory coping strategies (e.g., 
Hatch, 1997). Since irony can include contradictory emotional and mental states, it can also 
support other contradictory realities in sales, for instance acting simultaneously assertive and 
caring about the customer at the same time. In addition, some emotional coping strategies 
might provoke distress in salespeople, yet irony might help them to put into perspective these 
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negative feelings (Vaillant, 1998), because similar to humor, it produces a dissociation from 
negative feelings (Keltner, 1995). As a consequence, laughter often arises in negative contexts 
and accompanies shifts toward more positive emotions (Bonanno, 2001). The ability to show a 
sense of humor and perspective about oneself is also part of Goleman’s (1998) concept of 
accurate self-assessment, which is closely linked to emotional intelligence. In short, an ironic 
perspective enables salespeople to handle better the contradictory demands of their profession. 
7) The role of personal norms: When dealing with one’s own emotions in the presence of 
customers, salespeople have to act in accordance with company norms, as well as their own 
personal norms. As Saarni (2000, p. 69) summarizes it: “Mature emotional competence, as 
defined here, assumes that moral character and ethical values deeply influence one’s emotional 
responses in ways that promote personal integrity”. Sabini and Silver (1998) express similar 
ideas in their explication of the role of character and the following of moral norms in the self-
regulation of emotions. Goleman (1998) states that the maintenance of standards of honesty 
and integrity is a determinant of trustworthiness and therefore a consequence of emotional 
intelligence, and Huy (1999, p. 335) acknowledges the importance of “a sense of honesty, 
fairness, justice, and respect” for fostering change processes within companies. After all, 
emotional competence concerns finding a ‘balance’ between the self (and what one feels and 
expresses) and the environment (i.e., how the social environment imposes constraints and 
accepts and responds to the self) (Saarni, 1999). Salespeople are frequently tempted to engage 
in unethical behavior, either through self-deception or pressure brought to bear by 
performance expectations, the directives of supervisors, or demands by customers. Salespeople 
must reconcile such demands with their own codes of conduct if they are to sustain their 
integrity in the organization, yet perform up to expectations.   
 
Part 1: Identification of emotional competence clusters  
The management of emotional competence: Our hypotheses are developed and tested 
within the context of personal selling by salespeople who span the boundaries of their own 
organization and multiple customer organizations. Considerable research in organization studies 
has been conducted into such boundary spanners as flight attendants (Hochschild, 1983), 
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entertainment employees (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989), convenience stores clerks (Sutton & 
Rafaeli, 1988; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1990), and bill collectors and police interrogators (Hochschild, 
1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991; Sutton, 1991).  
Our aim in Part 1 is to distinguish highly emotionally competent salespeople from less 
competent ones using cluster analysis. We expect that people identified in an emotional 
competent cluster will be capable to better integrate the seven emotion proficiencies discussed 
above, which involves complex integrative skills. For instance, even though emotionally 
competent people engage in perspective taking, they also engage in self-presentation of their 
emotions and helps others to come to accept their emotions. The emotional competent 
salesperson reminds us of Maccoby’s (1977) “gamesman”, who is capable of being empathic, 
dramatizing his/her ideas, and stimulating others without having feelings of guilt. As Maccoby 
(1977, p. 48) points out, “(The gamesman) responds to work and life as a game. The contest 
hypes him up and he communicates his enthusiasm, thus energizing others.” The gamesman is 
able to stay detached in such a way that he can integrate seemingly contradictory competencies: 
“His character is a collection of near paradoxes understood in terms of its adaptation to the 
organizational requirements” (Maccoby, 1977, p. 100). Salespeople high in emotional 
competence as defined by cluster analysis are expected to score relatively high on all seven 
proficiencies. 
We also expect to find in our cluster analysis a group of salespeople that is the opposite 
of the emotionally competent group. The nature of this group can be discerned in research by 
Rafaeli and Sutton (1987). Some people are unable to shape their emotions so as to influence 
others, and some people lack strong normative control over their emotions. Salespeople low in 
emotional competence are expected to score relatively low on all seven proficiencies, which is 
characterized by their inability to enforce their emotions onto others or to have clear norms 
about their emotions. For instance, this group is at the same time lacking in empathy, unable to 
act authentically, and not guided much by emotional norms. There are several reasons why such 
a group of salespeople might be found. As Saarni (1999) notes, feelings of strong dissonance 
might be signs for a person to leave the organization or to choose another career. In other terms, 
people in this group do not fit the organisation or job. The low emotional competent group also 
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might include salespeople who suffer burnout, especially connected to depersonalisation (e.g., 
Maslach, 1982).  
The high and low emotionally competent groups are characterized by consistency of 
emotional character across all seven proficiencies. In addition, we further expect one or more 
groups of salespeople who score high on one or so dimensions yet low on the others. Such an 
outcome is consistent with research identifying emotionally dissonant people (e.g., Hochschild, 
1979; 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Ashforth & Tomiuk, 2000). Emotional dissonance is 
experienced “when one’s displayed emotions differ from one’s actual emotions” (Ashforth & 
Tomiuk, 2000, p. 185). A number of explanations account for dissonant feelings that are in 
contradistinction with one’s inner feelings. Rafaeli and Sutton (1987) speak about feelings of 
guilt that emerge when people express emotions. Similarly, as noted above, Parkinson (1991) 
discovered that some hairdressers experienced guilt as a result of inducing customers to share 
their private feelings. Or else, salespeople might experience guilt having persuaded customers to 
buy their product. In this regard, Exline and Lobel (1999) also consider how people come to feel 
ambivalent about their own feelings. They show that when people achieve dominance, they 
sometimes feel guilty, as they fear appearing too successful in comparison with others and 
risking negative attacks for standing out.   
Hypothesis 1: Salespeople will differ in emotional competence such that the 
pattern of response to measures of the seven proficiencies will yield clusters of 
salespeople who are either consistent or inconsistent in emotional competency. 
The consistent respondents will either be predominantly high or low in scores 
across all seven proficiencies; the inconsistent respondents will be high on some, 
low on other, emotional proficiencies, where one or more proficiencies come to 
dominate and differentiate these salespeople from the high and low emotionally 
competent salespeople.  
Method of Analysis  
A total of 780 questionnaires was sent to salespeople who worked in two automotive 
dealerships in the Netherlands. Two hundred and twenty salespeople returned the questionnaires 
for a 28 % response rate. In exchange for their participation, respondents received a gift worth 
14 
25 Dutch Guilders (or about 12 US dollars). The sample can be described as follows: a majority 
(78%) of the salespeople were men, 34% of the salespeople were 30 years old and younger, 39% 
were between 30 and 40, 13% between 41 and 50, and 14% were older than 50. With respect to 
experience, 24% of the sample had been with the organization less than 2 years, 51% had been 
with the firm between 2 and 6 years, and 25% were with the company between 6 and 20 years. 
Finally, most salespeople had finished basic and advanced vocational studies. But only 4 % had 
a university or college degree, which is typical of selling jobs in Europe.   
The data analysis made use of a three-stage analytical strategy. First, a factor analysis was 
conducted on the emotional competence scale items (described below) in order to discover the 
dimensionality of the scales. Second, based on these dimensions, a cluster analysis was 
conducted to uncover the different types of emotionally competent people. Third, to validate the 
utility of the clusters, multivariate analyses of variance were performed on the dimensions of 
emotional competency, regarding coping tendencies, social capital, and performance (see 
below).   
Measures 
Emotional competence scale: We utilized a 17-item scale to measure the seven emotion 
proficiencies that constitute emotional competence as described above (see appendix). The 
development of the items was mainly based on Saarni’s (1999) description of emotional 
competence, as well as in depth interviews with salespeople. Two items (e.g., “I can easily put 
myself in the place of the customers and their needs”) refer to one’s “capacity for empathic and 
sympathetic involvement with others’ emotional experiences” (Saarni, 1999, p. 162). Two items 
(e.g., “I feel little guilt when showing my enthusiasm during a sales interaction”) reflect the fact 
that emotionally competent people experience low levels of guilt about the way they manage 
their emotions, as their actions correspond to their idea of how it “should” be. As Saarni (1999, 
p. 278) notes, “in essence, we are living in accord with our personal theory of emotion” and 
“emotional self-efficacyvii may ultimately reflect one’s personal theory of emotion”. Saarni 
further points out that people at times also frequently express their true feelings within particular 
situations. Two additional items capture these tendencies. One of these items asserts, “My 
expressed emotions are part of what I see as my truthful way of dealing with people.” It should 
15 
be acknowledged that the expression of one’s true emotions does not necessarily occur 
automatically in a strategic context. As Saarni (1999, p. 201) observes, “there is continual 
reinforcement of motivation to manage how we present ourselves to others. At some point it is 
likely that we acquire habitual non-verbal behaviors that reflect self presentation attempts”. 
Saarni also finds that to be able to develop emotional competence one has to achieve a “balance 
between dissembled and genuine emotional-expressive behavior” (Saarni, 1999, p. 289). That is, 
both acting (dissembling) and authenticity (expression of genuine emotions) are part of 
emotional competence. We measured this proficiency with two items (e.g., “I am acquainted 
with creating emotions to facilitate the process of a sales interaction”). Three additional items 
were derived to measure the ability of the salesperson to convince others to accept his/her 
emotions (e.g., “Others have learned to accept the way I manage my emotions”). Next, the 
degree to which a person uses irony was measured by four items (e.g., “I can easily laugh about 
myself when my emotions get strong”). The final two items of the scale (e.g., “I have certain 
moral norms about the way I manage my emotions”) capture how personal character relates to 
emotional self-regulation.  
We performed maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblimin rotation on the 17 items 
by use of SPSS. The different dimensions of the scale were analyzed, and items not loading .50 
or greater on focal factors and .25 less on non-focal factors were deleted. Criteria for accepting 
factors relied on inspection of the scree plot (Briggs & Cheek, 1986; DeVellis, 1991). The 
results of the factor analysis suggested a 7-factor solution, as the scree plot revealed a relatively 
clear break after the seventh eigenvalue. The seven factors together explained 75 percent of the 
total variance (KMO = .78; eigenvalues were 4.82, 2.12, 1.47, 1.23, 1.15, 1.01, and 1.00). The 
reliabilities for items of each scale were also assessed by means of Cronbach’s alpha. The factor 
loadings and reliabilities are summarized in Table 1.  
[Place Table 1 about here] 
Results of a confirmatory factor analysis validate the seven factor structure. Satisfactory 
model fits are indicated by non-significant chi-square tests, RMSEA values less than .08 and 
CFI values greater than or equal to .90. Discussions of indices can be found in Bentler (1990) 
and Browne and Cudeck (1993). Although the chi-square was significant result ( χ2(98) = 
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150.47, p = .00), the other indices were satisfactory (CFI = .95 and RMSEA = .05) thus 
supporting the proposed measurement model. Factor loadings were high (range = .59 to .86, 
with exception of one item that achieved only a loading of .40). The measures of discriminant 
validity (i.e. the correlations between factors, corrected for attenuation) reveal that the factors 
are distinct (range = .34 to .58). 
Results of cluster analysis 
We utilized cluster analysis to develop a typology of emotional competent people. The 
cluster analysis and its validation follow the split-sample validation approach suggested by 
Singh (1990). The data were split into two samples. The first sample was used to generate 
possible alternative cluster solutions. The second sample then was utilized to select the most 
optimum solution of these alternatives based on its stability and reproducibility. A schematic 
diagram of the procedure is given in Figure 1. 
[Place figure 1 about here] 
The data were randomly split into an analysis sample (Na = 114) and a validation sample 
(Nv = 106). The analysis sample was first used to find possible cluster solutions. Because the 
different dimensions of emotional competence were not expected to be nested in each other, a 
non-hierarchical cluster analysis was selected, namely K-means clustering. However, the K-
means procedure is known to be sensitive to the required a priori specifications of the number of 
clusters to be extracted, as well as their centroids (Punj & Stewart, 1983). Therefore a 
hierarchical cluster analysis (using the Ward's method in SPSS X) with the seven factors of 
emotional competence was performed initially. An examination of the dendogram and the icicle 
diagram suggested a plausible range of 3 to 7 meaningful clusters. These plausible cluster 
numbers and their centroid estimates were used in a subsequent K-means cluster analysis. Next, 
using the validation sample, we entered cluster centers for each of the plausible solutions 
obtained from the analysis sample into a K-means cluster analysis. For all possible cluster 
numbers, a constrained and an unconstrained solution were computed. The constrained solution 
classifies all cases in the validation sample based on the cluster results of the analysis sample. 
On the other hand, the unconstrained solution does not impose any restrictions on clustering. 
The chance corrected coefficient of agreement of the constrained and the unconstrained cluster 
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solutions (Kappa) were computed to identify an optimum: a maximum Kappa represents the 
solution with the highest internal validity, i.e., maximum stability and reproducibility. The 
Kappas for the 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 cluster solutions were 0.67, 0.70, 0.59, 0.53, and 0.64, 
respectively. Because the decision criterion is to maximize Kappa, a 4-cluster solution was 
proposed as the most internally valid combination of clusters; its Kappa does not fall below the 
critical 0.70-limit and can therefore be regarded as satisfactory (e.g., Singh, 1990). Once the 
optimal cluster value was determined, the analysis and the validation samples were pooled again 
and input into a final K-means cluster analysis with the number of clusters specified as the 
optimal value to receive the centroids for the whole sample. The results of this final cluster 
analysis are displayed in Table 2. 
[Place Table 2 about here] 
Based on the cluster means for the seven factors of emotional competence, the clusters 
were interpreted as follows. Cluster 1, consistent with Hypothesis 1, represents individuals that 
show high emotional competence on all proficiencies (thus our label, high emotionally 
competent salespeople). These salespeople perceive the emotions of their communication 
partners accurately, adapt their emotions to situational necessities, and stay authentic at the same 
time. Further, these salespeople are able to regulate their emotions by using irony and thereby 
distance themselves from their emotions. At the same time, they keep strong norms about how to 
manage their emotions and they do not feel guilty about managing their emotions. Also, others 
are accepting of their emotion management style. 
Cluster 2 consists of salespeople with low emotional competence, a cluster also anticipated 
in Hypothesis 1. The low emotionally competent salespeople score lowest on all dimensions of 
the emotional competence scale – with the exception of guilt, where cluster 3 scores even lower. 
The most striking result for these salespeople is their very strong feelings of not being authentic 
in their displayed emotions. At the same time, they also think that other people do not accept the 
way they manage their emotions, and they are unable to distance themselves from their emotions 
by using irony. Moreover, these are the only salespeople who characterize themselves as 
lacking, relatively, norms or limits on the management of their emotions. 
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Cluster 3 consists of salespeople who experience strong feelings of guilt regarding the way 
they manage and use their emotions. Furthermore, they lack empathy to a certain extent. These 
salespeople use emotions in an instrumental way to help them achieve their communicative 
goals, yet, at the same time they consciously feel inauthentic when doing so. This group exhibits 
properties consistent with Hochschild’s (1983) concept of emotional dissonance (hence, our 
label: the emotionally dissonant cluster).  
Cluster 4 consists of individuals who score slightly above the average on every dimension 
of emotional competence, except irony. That is, they are quite empathic, they are able to adapt 
their emotional display to the situation and yet be authentic, but they are not able to distance 
themselves from and regulate their emotions through irony. Consistent with Saarni’s (1999) 
interpretation, we say that the salespeople here fail to laugh at themselves, therefore making it 
difficult for them to flexibly apply their coping styles in different situations (hence, we term this 
the low-irony cluster). People who are not able to laugh at themselves have difficulty detaching 
and distancing themselves from the contradictory emotional experiences they have now and 
then.  
The four clusters achieve internal validity (high Kappa) and are conceptually meaningful. 
The data therefore provide evidence for four types of salespeople, thus confirming Hypothesis 1. 
We found that emotionally competent salespeople can be distinguished from emotionally less 
competent salespeople. The former group comprised about 16% of the sample. Moreover we 
found three different subgroups of emotionally less competent salespeople, two of which (i.e., 
the low emotionally competent group and the emotionally dissonant group) are discussed in the 
literature on emotional work. In addition, we found a third group of emotionally less competent 
salespeople, the low-irony group, that has not been mentioned in the literature before but ex post 
facto can be interpreted in a meaningful way. Below we test the predictive validity of these 
clusters.  
Part 2: Implications of Emotional Competency 
Emotional coping: One question we explore is whether emotionally competent salespeople 
display mature coping strategies when they experience positive and negative interpersonal 
emotions. Emotional competent people possess an integrated working self of emotional 
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competencies that affords a general facilitation of their handling of emotional encounters: 
“emotional competence is evident in the capacity for adaptive coping insofar as all the preceding 
abilities or skills involved in emotional competence are also involved in effective coping” 
(Saarni, 1999, p. 219). 
In the literature (e.g., Campos, 1994; Lazarus, 1991), emotional coping or emotional 
regulation is perceived as the person’s ability to manage one’s subjective experience (or 
appraisal) of emotion and the ability to manage strategically one’s expression of emotion in 
communicative contexts. We explore two situations. One is where salespersons experience a 
positive emotion (pride) and the other is when they experience a negative emotion (envy). We 
chose pride because recent research by Verbeke and Bagozzi (2002) shows that pride is an 
energizing emotion and is the most frequently and intensely felt self-conscious emotion 
mentioned by salespeople. Envy was chosen because it also is energizing and is a negative 
emotion and therefore provides a contrast to pride, which is positive.  
Pride is a self-conscious emotion that emerges when the person evaluates him/herself 
through the values and expectations of significant others (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). Although 
having adaptive social functions, self-conscious emotions come with a dark side in some cases 
(Barret, 1995). In the case of pride, people may feel overconfident and display egoistic behavior, 
which draws attention to their successes and other people’s relative failures and then leads to 
envy and possible malicious reactions. At the same time, feelings and expressions of pride are 
not always negative (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2001). For instance, pride might signal to an 
interaction partner one’s ability to match the norms and expectations of the social environment 
and promote a positive spiral (Gilbert, 1990). Salespeople should contain their expressions of 
pride because, if too intense, they might be interpreted by their colleagues as ‘hubris’, which is 
defined as exaggerated pride or overconfidence and often results in negative reactions by others 
(e.g., Lewis, 2000). One way that salespeople might contain pride is to engage in pride coping. 
Based on recent research by Campos (1994), we propose four coping strategies that salespeople 
might use. The first two relate to the experience of pride: staying focused (e.g., remaining 
grounded) and using pride as a source of extra energy (e.g., seeing it as a call to work harder). 
The two other coping strategies are about the expression of pride: control of one’s expressions of 
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pride (e.g., avoiding displays of arrogance) and holding back one’s pride (e.g., keeping pride to 
one’s self). These coping strategies correspond to the categories of coping behavior that Saarni 
(1997) found to be most adaptive in her study of the usefulness of coping strategies.  
It is difficult though to determine “one best way” of coping, as it is often difficult to 
distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive coping (Matthews & Zeidner, 2000). The 
adaptiveness of a particular coping behavior is highly dependent on the criteria adopted and the 
situation of interest: what is adaptive in one situation may be maladaptive in another (e.g., 
Saarni, 1997). Psychologists therefore propose that it is adaptive to have a range of different 
coping strategies available from which one can flexibly choose (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; 
Saarni, 1997). High emotional competence goes along with a broad range of available coping 
strategies, as emotional competence is a syndrome of competencies that is flexibly applied in 
emotion-eliciting situations to make a judgement on particular behaviors (Saarni, 2000). Saarni 
(1999, p. 226) summarizes the relationship between emotional competence and coping as 
follows: “optimal self- and emotion-regulation development appears to entail the acquisition of a 
flexible repertoire of coping strategies.” Yet emotionally competent people not only have a 
broader range of coping strategies, but they also have the wisdom to choose a socially adequate 
and appropriate behavior for the particular situation in question. They are able to accept their 
own emotional experiences (Saarni, 1999, 2000), yet emotional competence also entails 
empathy, which enables individuals to feel with others, understand their needs and expectancies, 
and foresee the feelings that their behavior elicits in others (Eisenberg, 2000). Consistent with 
these observations, Eisenberg et al. (1996) found that empathy predicts socially appropriate 
behavior and constructive coping. Emotionally competent people are able to direct their 
behavior according to this knowledge, because they are able to regulate their own emotions 
strategically and assume a long-term perspective. In other words, adaptive and emotionally 
competent coping does not mean that one is oriented towards feeling better right away (Saarni, 
1999). Emotionally competent people have the maturity to choose coping efforts that are “more 
comprehensive and may lead to greater self-efficacy and emotional well-being in the long run, 
and accepting feeling badly in the short run may be part of the bargain” (Saarni, 1999, p. 219). 
As a consequence, we expect that emotionally competent salespeople accept and do not hold 
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back their emotions inappropriately, and positive emotions do not alienate them from their 
(social) environment. Instead, emotionally competent salespeople remain well connected to 
others and are capable of using pride as a self-motivator concerning their feelings of self-
efficacy.  
Envy is experienced when a person compares him/herself to another person on a self-
relevant dimension and becomes aware of the negative discrepancy between one’s own 
performance and that of significant others (e.g., Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Tesser, 1991). Feelings 
of envy are indications that a person wants to match significant others accomplishments -- envy 
in other words, although a competitive emotion, often instigates greater effort in goal striving 
(Buss, 2000). Like pride, however, envy may also become maladaptive. Envious salespeople, for 
instance, might be so consumed by their envy that they fail to help others when needed and even 
react in destructive ways. Or else, envious salespeople might spread rumors, and in turn provoke 
feelings of guilt, thus creating cycles of negative self-conscious emotions (e.g., Parrott, 1991).  
To cope with envy, salespeople are hypothesized to use the four coping strategies 
mentioned above. Two of these coping strategies relate to the experience of envy: staying 
focused (e.g., “If only I will not get distracted, I can match their accomplishments.”) and second, 
using envy as an energizer (e.g., “Next time I will just work harder so that others do not perform 
better than I.”). Two strategies relate to the expression of envy: being willing to openly 
recognize the performance of a significant other (e.g., congratulating colleagues) and holding 
back one’s feeling of envy (e.g., “I keep on working without showing my true feelings.”). Again, 
given our definition of emotional competence as a syndrome, we expect that emotionally 
competent salespeople will be able to accept their emotions, yet show socially appropriate 
coping strategies (Saarni, 1999, 2000). Experiencing the negative feelings that come with envy, 
emotionally competent people are able to see the negative consequences of expressing their 
negative feelings and therefore dissemble these negative emotions better than less emotionally 
competent salespeople. Emotionally competent salespeople take responsibility for their lower 
performance and in so doing use their envy to energize themselves rather than letting it 
degenerate into gossiping or spreading negative rumors.  
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Hypothesis 2a: Emotionally competent salespeople will cope better with 
their pride than less emotionally competent people. They do this by 
accepting their experience of pride, interpreting it in positive ways, and 
managing their expression of pride so as not to antagonize others.  
Hypothesis 2b: Emotionally competent salespeople will cope better with 
envy than less emotionally competent sales people. They do this by 
accepting their experience of envy, interpreting it in positive ways, and 
managing their expression of envy so as not to disparage others but rather 
energizing goal pursuit. 
Social capital and performance: We propose that high emotionally competent 
salespeople will have higher social capital, better customer relations, and better sales 
performance than emotionally less competent salespeople. Before explaining how this happens, 
we first need to develop what social capital is.  
Weitz and Bradford (1999) show that salespeople provide added value to customers 
when they cooperate with their customers as well as with colleagues dispersed all over the 
organization and with others in their social network. Social networks are “friends, colleagues, 
and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and 
social capital” (Burt, 1992, p. 9). Social capital is one’s ability to mobilize the members of one’s 
social network to share and provide such resources as knowledge, political support, or 
friendship. Researchers have identified two useful dimensions of social capital (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998, p. 122).  One is relational social capital and refers to the personal relationships 
people have developed through a history of interactions that result in such outcomes as respect 
and friendship. A second is structural social capital and refers to the overall pattern of 
connections between actors; that is, structural social capital constitutes whom one reaches and 
how one reaches them. A well-known characteristic of the effective use of network structures is 
the ability to create “structural holes”: that is, people strategically create isolated individuals or 
clusters of individuals in their network that are dependent on or facilitate a focal person’s 
dealings with others (Burt, 1992). 
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 Researchers have suggested that as we move toward an era of networked organizations, 
people’s ability to manage emotions will be key (e.g., Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 
2000; Gibson, 1997). As a consequence, social capital and performance of salespeople can be 
linked to emotional competence and its constituting skills. First, we expect that the emotionally 
competent salespeople will score higher on social capital because their empathic abilities foster 
grounded feedback about their own emotional styles and also help provide insight into what 
drives others (e.g., one learns what are the preferred modes and ranges of emotional expression 
of partners: “individuals should constrain emotional expression in order to function effectively 
in interpersonal relationships in ways that are sensitive to other people’s emotional needs and 
competencies,” (Martin et al., 2000, p. 116). Second, emotionally competent salespeople 
deliberately control their expressions of emotions to achieve their goals. As Saarni (1999, p. 6) 
puts it, “depending on whom we are with and what we are feeling, we express our emotions with 
communicative intent, that is, our emotional-expressive behavior is meaningful to others.” The 
management of one’s displayed emotions is a rich example of what Goffman (1969) calls 
“control moves” that influence the actions of others. In addition, emotionally competent 
salespeople maintain a set of norms that they do not transgress; consequently, they become 
trusted and respected members in the organization. In short, we believe that emotionally 
competent salespeople will achieve higher relational and structural social capital. 
For similar reasons, we also expect that emotionally competent salespeople will achieve 
higher levels of performance (particularly better customer relations and higher sales) than less 
emotionally competent salespeople. Spiro and Weitz (1989), for instance, show that salespeople 
who are more adaptive achieve better sales performance than those who are less adaptive. 
Similarly, because emotionally competent salespeople flexibly adapt their coping strategies 
when meeting different customers or sales situations, we expect that their performance will be 
higher than less emotionally competent salespeople. Yet, emotionally competent salespeople are 
able to stay authentic in such encounters, which is also important. Erickson and Wharton (1997) 
argue that because customers are able to discriminate between authentic and inauthentic 
emotions, it is not sufficient that service agents control their display of emotions. They also 
should actually feel these emotions. Moreover, it is important that salespeople not feel guilty 
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about the way they use their emotions instrumentally because guilt leads to corrective actions 
(e.g., Lewis, 2000) that could conflict with goals they intend to achieve. For instance, feeling 
guilty about “manipulating” one’s own emotions as well as another’s emotions could induce 
salespeople to compensate for this guilt by selling products for too low of prices.   
Hypothesis 3: Emotionally competent salespeople will achieve greater 
relational and structural social capital than less emotionally competent 
salespeople.  
Hypothesis 4: Emotionally competent salespeople will achieve higher 
levels of performance (better customer relations and sales) than less 
emotionally competent salespeople.  
Method of Analysis 
Measures 
The appendix presents all items used in the study, and Table 3 displays the factor loadings 
and reliabilities for the items we describe below. As can be seen from Table 3, all scales achieve 
high reliabilities.  
[Place Table 3 about here] 
Social Capital: This scale was inspired by the work of Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) and 
consists of 21 seven-point Likert-scale items. The items reflect salespeople’s ability to mobilize 
resources by means of relational and structural social capital. The first 10 items were used to 
measure relational social capital. Three items measure an employee’s ability to get additional 
information about his/her own organization (e.g., “Almost everybody shares information with 
me about important topics in our organization”). Three items measures one’s ability to get 
additional information about the market and the customer (e.g., “Outside the organization it is 
easy to attain information about the market”). Four items measure the extent to which a 
salesperson is able to develop trust in others inside and outside his/her organization (e.g., 
“People can trust me as a colleague, because I always have been straight forward”). Ten items 
measure structural social capital, namely a salesperson’s abilities to connect with people (e.g., “I 
can get the better people in my organization around me to get projects done”), to create 
structural holes (e.g., “I get the important information quicker than others”), and to achieve 
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strategic information (e.g., “I make sure that I attain the strategic information from my 
colleagues”).  
A factor analysis revealed six factors (KMO = .86; eigenvalues of 7.40, 2.40, 1.78, 1.28, 
1.11, and 1.00) that explained 70 percent of the total variance (see Table 3). Factor 1 can be 
interpreted as loose information ties, that is, getting easy access to internal organizational 
information. The second factor relates to customer information ties, i.e., the ability to get 
external information, namely about the market and about customers. The third factor we call 
structural information holes. Salespeople scoring high on this factor receive information that is 
relevant for them quicker than their colleagues. Behavior that is needed to successfully establish 
a network that provides one with strategic information is reflected in factor 4. Factor 5, 
implementation, describes the ability to connect oneself with people that help in achieving one's 
goals. The last factor was called trust, and reflects the extent to which salespeople perceive that 
others trust them. 
The proposed 6-factor structure is supported by results of a confirmatory factor analysis. 
Although the chi-square was significant (χ2 (174) = 399.36, p = .00), the other indices were 
satisfactory (CFI = .90 and RMSEA = .08). Factor loadings were high, ranging from .51 to .92. 
Correlations between factors as measures of discriminant validity shows that the factors are 
distinct (range = .40 to .80). 
We acknowledge that the use of self-reported measures for social capital might be 
problematic, although meta-analyses suggest that subjective measures are reliable and valid 
(Churchill, Ford, Hartley, & Walker, 1985). To check for a possible bias in salespeople’s 
responses we compared results from self-report versus manager evaluations in another study. 
Based on items for which managers had information, we selected 12 items for presentation to 
sales managers. viii  In this study, we found a correlation of .46 (p<.01) between the self-reports 
by salespeople and the evaluations of salespeople by the managers, indicating that the use of 
self-report measures seems to yield valid measures.  
The customer relations scale (6 items) was adopted from Swenson, Singh, and Rhoads 
(1994) and measures different aspects of the quality of salespeople’s customer relationships: for 
example, trust (e.g., “In general I create trust in my customers regarding my products/ 
26 
services.”) and keeping promises (e.g., “I keep my promises to customers.”). All responses were 
obtained on a seven-point completely disagree-completely agree Likert-scale. Factor analysis 
revealed that the scale consists of a single factor (KMO = .84, eigenvalue = 3.34, explaining 56 
percent of the variance). The factor loading ranged from .66 to .82, and reliability was .82. 
The sales performance scale (5 items) was adopted from Behrman and Perreault (1984). It 
consists of five quantitative aspects of sales performance including the total amount of sales 
(e.g., “Compared to an average salesperson, I can generate a high sales amount.”) or the ability 
to achieve one’s sales goals (e.g., “Compared to an average salesperson, I exceed most of the 
sales goals throughout the whole year.”). Responses were obtained on a seven-point Likert-
scale. The exploratory factor analysis suggests that the items form a single factor (KMO = .75, 
eigenvalue = 2.68, explaining 54 percent of the variance), with factor loadings ranging from .67 
to .78. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient of this scale was .78. Similar to the social capital scale, 
we also tested the sales performance scale for possible self-reported bias. In the same study as 
mentioned above, sales managers evaluated the sales performance of their salespersons who 
independently provided self-reports of their sales performance. The self-report measures and the 
manager evaluations achieved a correlation of .34 (p<.05; n=39). 
The coping with pride scale had 13 seven-point Likert-scale items. The item development 
was inspired by existing research on coping (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Folkman & Lazarus, 1988) and 
coping strategies identified as most adaptive (Saarni, 1997, 1999). Five items concern what 
Lazarus calls “positive reappraisal” and Saarni terms “reframing” (e.g., “I think: ‘Remain who 
you are’”). Two items refer to the strategy of “self-control“ (e.g., “I try not to get too self-
satisfied so that I do not give the impression of being arrogant”). Three items (e.g., “I try to stay 
modest”) refer to coping strategies that Lazarus (1991) and Saarni (1997) summarize as 
“distancing”. Finally, two items measure problem-focused coping (e.g., “I try not to get too self-
satisfied so that I am able to keep on performing.”). Saarni (1997) terms these “problem-solving 
strategies”, and Lazarus (1991, p. 112) calls them “action-centered” forms of coping. The factor 
analysis showed a four factor solution (KMO = .85; eigenvalues of 5.74, 1.79, 1.14, and 1.01) 
which explained 73 percent of the total variance. The characteristics of the factors are 
summarized in Table 3. 
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The factors found reflect the coping strategies “management of emotional experience” 
(factors 1 and 3) and “management of emotional expression” (factors 2 and 4) (see Campos, 
1994, Lazarus, 1991, Folkman & Lazarus, 1988, and Saarni, 1997; 1999). Factor 1 refers to 
coping techniques that can be described as “compensating”, that is, changing one’s perspective 
by extending one’s cognitive frame from the experienced emotion to the whole self, thus 
limiting the importance of the actually felt emotion and staying focused. “Holding back” (factor 
2) describes a person’s attempts to suppress one’s emotions and cope with them internally. 
Factor 3 suggests the use of one’s experienced emotions to motivate the self. One may feel 
“extra energy” to work harder and thus change the emotion-eliciting situation. Finally, 
“controlled expression” (factor 4) characterizes attempts to regulate one’s display of emotions in 
order to avoid giving a bad image to others and provoking negative reactions.  
The Coping with envy scale was constructed from 10 items with responses coded on 
seven-point Likert-scales. Similar to the coping with pride scale, this scale was created to reflect 
Lazarus’ and Saarni’s four coping strategies of positive reappraisal (two items; e.g., “I 
immediately think that I could also achieve this performance, if I worked hard, too.”), self-
controlling (three items; e.g., “I recognize that they have achieved their successes by working 
hard.”), distancing (three items; e.g., “I try to give a relaxed impression that differs from my 
inner feelings.“), and problem-solving (two items; e.g., “I keep on working hard so that others 
will not top me.”). Factor analysis supported four factors (KMO = .70; eigenvalues of 3.20, 2.10, 
1.35, and 1.01, explaining 76 percent of the variance). The factor loadings and reliabilities are 
shown in Table 3. 
The reliability of only one scale (factor1 of coping with envy) did not exceed the critical 
value of 0.70, but should be satisfactory for exploratory purposes. The factor structure found for 
coping with envy was similar to the one found for coping with pride, and the factors therefore 
are labeled similarly.  
Results of MANOVA 
We investigated the predictive validity of the emotional competency clusters. That is, we 
checked the influence of cluster membership on coping strategies, social capital, and 
performance: namely, coping with pride, coping with envy, sales performance, quality of 
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customer relationships, and relational and structural social capital. We ran MANOVA with the 
coping, performance, and social capital variables as dependent variables and the configural 
emotional competency clusters of salespeople as multicategory independent treatment variables. 
If the null hypothesis of no differences was rejected, we conducted individual ANOVAs with the 
different dependent variables. Initially, we tested for equality of the variance-covariance 
matrices across the groups as group sizes differed considerably between the four clusters. Box's 
test suggested the equality of the covariance matrices across the four groups (Box's M = 525.94, 
approx. F = 1.081, p=0.13). The MANOVA produced the following statistics: Wilk's Lambda of 
0.568, F = 2.30, p<0.000. This suggests that the dependent variables differ significantly across 
the four types of emotionally competent salespeople. Cluster membership explained 9 percent of 
the variance of coping strategies with pride and envy (observed power = 1.00) and 12 percent of 
the variance of the performance and social capital measures (observed power = 1.00). Because 
group sizes differed significantly, we applied the Scheffè multiple comparison procedure to test 
which groups were significantly different from the others. The results of the variance analysis 
are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. 
[Place Table 4 about here] 
As the F-values show, the emotional competence cluster membership is associated with 
substantial differences in salespeople’s coping behavior, when experiencing envy, as well as 
with substantial differences in the coping strategy of using pride as a spur to working harder. 
Table 4 shows that emotionally competent salespeople achieve significantly higher scores on 
three out of four strategies in coping with envy; that is, they stay focused in spite of 
experiencing envy and they use their envy as a source of self-motivation to work harder. In 
addition, emotionally competent salespeople control their expressions of envy. No significant 
differences between the different clusters of emotional competence were found regarding the 
coping strategy of holding back feelings of envy. Hypothesis 2b is therefore mainly supported. 
Thus, the emotionally competent group of salespeople uses significantly more “mature” coping 
strategies (Saarni, 1999) than the less emotionally competent clusters. Moreover, these 
salespeople are not only characterized by high scores on coping strategies relative to other 
groups, they also achieve high scores on an absolute level. This indicates that they are able to 
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use a wide range of different coping strategies, which functions to regulate emotions and 
interpersonal situations (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  
Regarding the experiencing of pride, we found that emotionally competent salespeople are 
better able to use this emotion as a self motivator for staying focused and expending extra 
energy. No significant differences were found for the two other coping strategies. Hypothesis 2a 
therefore received mixed support.  
Performance and social capital: We first investigated the inter-cluster differences for the 
performance and social capital variables. The observed power, i.e., the probability that the F-test 
will detect differences between groups equal to those implied by the sample difference, was 
higher than 0.95 for all dependent variables, except for the two social capital dimensions “loose 
information ties” (power = 0.73) and “implementation” (power = 0.80). As the F-values show, 
the relationship between cluster membership to the four types of emotionally competent 
salespeople and the performance and social capital variables is substantial. The differences 
between the four clusters of emotionally competent salespeople are substantively meaningful.  
[Place Table 5 about here] 
The data provide strong support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. The highly emotional 
competent salespeople achieve both the highest performance and the greatest social capital. As 
can be seen in Table 5, cluster 1 scores significantly higher than the other clusters on almost all 
dependent variables. That is, the high emotionally competent salespeople (cluster 1) perform 
better both on customer relations and on sales than the emotionally dissonant salespeople and 
the low emotionally competent salespeople (clusters 2 and 3). The same patterns were found for 
social capital: On all eight dimensions cluster 1 scored significantly higher than clusters 2 and 3, 
except for the dimension ‘implementation’, where cluster 1 achieved only significant higher 
scores compared to cluster 2.  
Discussion 
As we are moving into an era where social capital plays an increasingly important role in 
an organization’s success, there will be a need to understand how employees self-regulate their 
emotions. Emotional intelligence clearly does not answer this question satisfactorily as it does 
not take into account the appropriateness of the employee’s regulatory actions in terms of 
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maintaining personal and organizational goals and norms. Indeed, within many business-to-
business selling jobs, which characterize fluid and ever-changing organizations, there often are 
no clear guidelines on how to manage emotions (Rousseau, 1997), and this is especially the case 
with customer boundary spanners that operate outside the firm with customers. Rather, emotion 
management is frequently characterized by ambiguity and contradiction (Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2001; R.J. Erickson, 1997). To deal with ambivalent and contradictory situations, 
people must purposively construct a working self, consisting of emotional competencies that 
should have some degree of social consensus about their meaning and predictability but also 
contain some degree of unique personal ‘flavor’ reflecting how salespeople cope with particular 
emotionally challenging situations (Saarni, 1999, p. 299). In our study, we identified which 
salespeople were emotionally competent and which are not, based on their self-designated scores 
on seven domain-specific emotional proficiencies.  
Noteworthy here was the finding that the emotionally competent cluster scored high on 
seven emotion proficiencies and attained full integration of these emotional proficiencies. Saarni 
(1999, p. 300) speculates that the ability to make a working model, in which contradictory 
emotional skills become integrated, provides the basis for personal satisfaction and a self-image 
of accomplishment. Indeed, these salespeople a) engaged in mature coping strategies when 
experiencing pride and envy, b) achieved higher social capital, and c) performance was higher 
than those salespeople in the remaining clusters. It should be noted that this group of salespeople 
constitutes only a minority (16%) of the sample being studied, which confirms E.H. Erikson’s 
(1963) observation that only a small number of people achieve at a high level of emotional 
control.   
We found three groups of low or less emotionally integrated salespeople. The first had a 
low score on all emotional proficiencies, except guilt where they scored high. This group tended 
to display immature coping with envy and pride and achieved the lowest amount of social 
capital, as well as the lowest scores on performance. What might be behind the poor profile 
exhibited by members of this group? One possibility is that these salespeople lack the ability to 
empathize or are alexithmymic. Alternatively, members of this group may have a history of such 
problems as burnout. Our post hoc analysis revealed that salespeople in this group were less 
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educated (i.e., they tended to have only a high school education, compared to their colleagues 
who had more advanced vocational education), which might have dampened their enthusiasm 
and resulted in a feeling that they would never be promoted or caused them to feel inferior to the 
better educated group and their customers. 
The second inconsistent group was the emotionally dissonant group, which is similar to 
Rafaeli’s and Sutton’s (1987) emotional dissonant group. Notice that this group of people 
contained a significant number of salespeople (28% of the sample). What is typical for this 
group is that they experience high levels of guilt, feel inauthentic, are less empathic, yet score 
high on character and a sense of irony. This group then reminds us of what has been called, 
people with a deviant orientation (R.J. Erickson, 1997); that is, actual interactions with 
customers probably do not reach their levels of expectations. They were the second worst group 
in attainment of social capital and performance. It should be noted that (though not statistically 
significant) people in this cluster used more mature coping strategies. For instance, in pride, they 
engaged in putting things into perspective, and this group also attained high levels of strategic 
information (one dimension of structural social capital).  
Finally, the third inconsistent group scored second highest of all four groups on empathy, 
dissociation of guilt, self-authenticity, management of self-presentation, and convincing others 
target to accept one’s emotions.  This group scored lowest on irony of all four groups, hence its 
label as the low-irony group, and it scored second to last on maintaining norms. In their 
laughter-as-dissociation hypothesis, Keltner and Bonanno (1997) give three arguments to 
explain the process of letting loose of one’s emotions through laughter. First, laughter involves 
shifts from positive to negative psychological states (e.g., Tomkins, 1984). Second, laughter 
produces a reduction in negative emotions associated with a certain situation (e.g., Krokoff, 
1991). Finally, the reduction of negative emotions creates positive feelings of amusement. These 
arguments, which were supported empirically, show that laughing at oneself leads to a certain 
amount of detachment from one’s emotional experiences. The result is some respite from 
needing to continuously work on one’s emotions, which can be stressful. In addition, a lack of or 
low irony inhibits one’s ability to interpret and reconcile contradictory emotional experiences. 
Salespeople in the low-irony group risk being prisoners of their emotions. Hatch (1997, p. 285) 
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notes in this context that “What is key here is that, with a little irony, we both can be conscious 
of these [contradictory emotional] processes and thereby bring them into clearer focus.” In other 
words, “Laughter, as theory and evidence indicate, is a transient, mild form of dissociation from 
distress that promises joy and perhaps peace” (Keltner and Bonanno, 1997, p. 688). Hatch 
illustrates the role of ironic humor in her study of managers: she found that via the use of humor 
managers construct their thoughts and emotions in a contradictory manner, focusing on laughter 
and humor as opposed to negative emotions, and these “contradictory emotions neutralized 
emotional denial so that contradictory cognitions could be confronted in a less-threatening, 
more-playful fashion” (Hatch, 1997, p. 287). Salespeople in the no irony group do not draw 
upon such coping resources. 
 A limitation that should be acknowledged is that self-reported measures were used in the 
present study.  Experimental research is needed to determine more precisely how emotional 
competence functions and what its boundary conditions are. In addition, objective measures of 
performance as criteria should be obtained, although meta-analyses suggest that subjective 
performance measures are reliable and valid in the personal selling area (Churchill, Ford, 
Hartley, & Walker, 1985) and results from a second study indicate that the self-report 
performance and social capital scale are moderately to highly correlated with manager 
evaluations. 
Future research 
Future research should explore whether emotional competence can be fostered.  Training 
programs, coaching, and mentoring may be effective ways of helping employees become more 
emotionally competent. In such a training the topic is not so much how people might adopt 
feeling rules or apply certain persuasion techniques, rather people are trained to employ a mind 
set that allows them to comfortably handle interactions with customers that are characterized by 
ambiguity. Research is needed as well to determine to what extent emotional competence and 
emotional intelligence are related to one another.  
Another area for research is the role of culture. As emotional competence is a skill that is 
learned in social contexts, it would be fruitful to investigate how people in different cultures 
acquire and use their emotional competencies to different degrees. For instance, some cultures 
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might emphasize that emotional competence is about integration, whereas other cultures might 
stress that emotional competence is about being authentic. This hypothesis can be linked to 
Markus and Kitayama’s (1991; 1994a,b) distinction of independent-based and interdependent-
based cultures. In independent-based cultures, the emphasis is on internal, individual emotional 
experiences and hence feelings of (in)authenticity are an important issue for their members; 
people seek to express their emotions and by doing so seek to differentiate themselves from 
others. In interdependent-based cultures, on the other hand the emphasis is on interactive 
emotional experience; therefore, members of these cultures are more likely to seek to integrate 
how their emotions fit into their social environments (see Saarni, 1999, p. 74). Similarly, Peng 
and Nisbett (1999) propose that cultures might differ according to their implicit epistemologies: 
for some cultures change, contradiction, and holism might be part of a cognitive framework of 
how people seek to understand the world. Such an investigation would not only provide insight 
into the boundary conditions governing emotional competence and its effects but might provide 
insight and policy guidelines for managing cross-cultural interactions. 
Finally, we studied the domain specific emotional competence of salespeople who interact 
with customers. But emotional competence also can be applied to other domains like human 
resource management or general management as well as to more general and functional tasks in 
and outside organizations such as for manager-subordinate relationships or entrepreneurial 
activities (e.g., Spencer & Spencer, 1993; Goleman, 1998). This deserves further study.  
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Appendix 1: items (loosely translated from the Dutch)  
 
Emotional competence proficiencies 
 
Empathy 
1. I can easily put myself in the place of the customers and their needs. 
2. I can tune my emotions to those of the customer. 
 
Guilt 
3. I feel little or no guilt about the way I manage my emotions. 
4. I feel little guilt when showing my enthusiasm during a sales interaction. 
 
Authenticity 
5. I feel that my expressed emotions are part of my sincere and deeper self. 
6. My expressed emotions are part of what I see as my truthful way dealing with people. 
 
Self-presentation 
7. I am acquainted with creating emotions to facilitate the process of a sales interaction. 
8. I can easily show a variety of emotions when the situation asks for it. 
 
Convincing others that one is genuine 
9. Others have learned to accept the way I manage my emotions. 
10. People accept how I manage my emotions. 
11. I feel that people can quickly feel my emotions. 
 
Irony 
12. Laughing about myself takes care that I do not get too emotional. 
13. Laughing keeps me from worrying about the question whether I show emotions that are 
adequate for the given social context. 
14. Whatever happens, I have learned to accept my emotions and look at them with some 
irony. 
15. I can easily laugh about myself when my emotions get too strong. 
 
Character 
16. Although being flexible with my emotions I also have limits. 
17. I have certain moral norms about the way I manage my emotions. 
 
Social capital dimensions 
 
Loose information ties 
1. I receive from everybody information about our own organization. 
2. Almost everybody shares information with me about important topics in our 
organization. 
3. When I ask for it, others in my organization easily provide me their knowledge about a 
specific domain or topic. 
 
Customer information 
4. Customers easily tell me the information they have heard about our competitors. 
5. Outside the organization it is easy to attain information about the market. 
6. Customers easily share information about their organizations with me. 
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Trust  
7. People give to me important tasks in the organization. 
8. People easily follow me to do things. 
9. People can trust me as a colleague, because I always have been straight forward. 
10. I am known by my colleagues that I stay committed on projects. 
 
Implementation 
11. In order to get something done in my organization I can surround myself by the better 
people in the organization. 
12. I can get the better people in my organization around me to get projects done. 
13. I know how to motivate others in order to finish up projects. 
 
Structural information holes 
14. If it comes down to getting information, I can attain it quicker than others. 
15. People tell me: You know always more than others. 
16. I am sometimes called the “street-smart” of the organization. 
17. Usually I am the first in my organization to get relevant strategic information of the 
market. 
18. By and by, I get the important information quicker than others.  
 
Strategic information 
19. I make sure that I attain the strategic information from my colleagues. 
20. I have made up a network such that I can get the essential information in my 
organization. 
21. I make sure that I know the right people in the organization (and I ask them) to get the 
important information about my organization. 
 
Dimensions of coping strategies for pride 
 
Stay focused 
In general, when realizing that others tell me or give me the impression that I am better than I 
have expected or better than others, I tend to proceed as follows... 
1. I immediately try to put my performance into perspective. 
2. I immediately think: ”Stay grounded despite of your performance.” 
3. I immediately think: “This is no reason to have your head in the clouds.” 
4. I think: “Stay who you are.” 
5. I immediately think that I would never have achieved such a performance alone. 
 
Control expression 
If feeling proud, ... 
6. I try not to get too self-satisfied so that I do not give the impression of being arrogant. 
7. I try not to get too self-satisfied so that others do not get estranged from me. 
 
Hold back 
If feeling proud, ... 
8. I tend to keep this feelings inside of me. 
9. I try to stay modest. 
10. I tend to control this feeling. 
 
Extra energy 
45 
If feeling proud, ... 
11. I try not to get too self-satisfied so that I am able to keep on performing. 
12. I try not to get presumptuous so that I am able to move my limits. 
13. I try not to get too self-satisfied so that I do not get presumptuous. 
 
Dimensions of coping strategies for envy 
 
Stay focused 
If my colleagues perform better than I and I experience some envy, I have learned to proceed as 
follows... 
1. I immediately think that I could also achieve this performance, if I worked hard, too. 
2. I immediately think: how can I avoid seeing myself as a worse salesperson. 
 
Control expression 
If my colleagues perform better than I and I experience some envy, I have learned to proceed as 
follows... 
3. I recognize that they have achieved their successes by working hard. 
4. I recognize that they have achieved their successes on their own by working hard. 
5. I do not put their performances down. 
 
Hold back 
If feeling envious in face of better performing colleagues, ... 
6. I try to give a relaxed impression that differs from my inner feelings. 
7. I keep on working as usual without letting show what I really feel. 
 
Extra energy 
To avoid experiencing envy in the future, ... 
8. I take care of performing well so that others will not top me. 
9. I keep on working hard so that others will not top me. 
10. I improve my work strategies so that others will not top me. 
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Figure 1. The split-sample validation clustering procedure 
Total
sample
(D)
Validation
sample
(D2)
Analysis
sample
(D1)
Random split
Initial
clusters
Hierarchical
cluster analysis
Final
clusters
(D1)
Non-hierarchical
cluster analysis
Final
clusters
(D2)
Final
clusters
(D2)
Non-hierarchical
cluster analysis
(iterative process)
Non-hierarchical
cluster analysis
(no iterations)
Total
sample
(D1 + D2)
Final
clusters
(D)
Choose
solution
with
highest
Kappa
Non-hierarchical
cluster analysis
 
 
 
Table 1. Competencies of emotional competence (factor loadings and reliabilities) 
 
Emotional Competence 
1) Empathy 2) Dissociation 
of guilt 
 
3) Authen-
ticity 
4) Managing 
self-
presentation 
5) Making 
target of 
accept one’s 
emotions 
6) Ironic 
perspective 
7) Moral 
character 
em1 (.81) 
em2 (.88) 
em3 (.88) 
em4 (.68) 
em5 (-.85) 
em6 (-.85) 
em7 (-.86) 
em8 (-.88) 
em9 (.79) 
em10 (.85) 
em11 (.70) 
em12 (-.68) 
em13 (-.85) 
em14 (-.66) 
em15 (-.84) 
em16 (.83) 
em17 (.84) 
Reliabilities  
0.72 0.56 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.70 
 
Table 2. Results of the cluster analysis 
 
 
 Score for cluster centers a 
Cluster Number of 
cases in each 
cluster 
Empathy Dissociation 
of Guilt 
 
Authen-
ticity 
Managing 
self-
presentation 
Making 
target 
accept one’s 
emotions 
Ironic 
perspective 
Character 
1) High 
emotionally 
competent 
cluster 
34 0.80 0.68 0.83 1.06 1.14 1.33 0.87 
2) Low 
emotionally 
competent 
cluster 
53 -0.54 -0.30 -1.70 -0.51 -0.80 -0.74 -0.71 
3) Emotionally 
dissonant 
cluster 
61 -0.29 -0.75 -0.46 0.29 -0.16 0.40 0.23 
4) Low-irony 
cluster 
68 0.27 0.57 0.22 0.55 0.20 -0.44 -0.09 
a To facilitate the interpretation we used z-standardized values in the table that have a mean of zero and 
a standard deviation of one. That is, –0.09, for instance, indicates an average activity on a dimension. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Factor loadings of measures (in parentheses) 
 
Social Capital  
1. loose 
information 
ties 
2. customer 
infor-
mation 
3. structural 
infor-
mation 
4. strategic 
infor-
mation 
5. imple-
mentation 
6. trust  
sc1 (.85) 
sc2 (.93) 
sc3 (.89) 
sc4 (.79) 
sc5 (.81) 
sc6 (.73) 
sc14 (.69) 
sc15 (.78) 
sc16 (.82) 
sc17 (.80) 
sc18 (.53) 
sc19 (.65) 
sc20 (.63) 
sc21 (.62) 
sc11 (.86) 
sc12 (.80) 
sc13 (.67) 
sc7 (-.53) 
sc8 (-.43) 
sc9 (-.80) 
 sc10 (-.80) 
 
Reliability   
.88 .73 .83 .70 .83 .82  
       
Coping with Pride 
1. stay 
focussed 
2. hold back 3. extra 
energy 
4. control 
expression 
   
tc1 (.61) 
tc2 (.91) 
tc3 (.84) 
tc4 (.70) 
tc5 (.50) 
tc8 (-.88) 
tc9 (-.79) 
 tc10 (-.92) 
tc11 (-.69) 
tc12 (-.79) 
tc13 (-.92) 
tc6 (.87) 
tc7 (.93) 
   
Reliability     
.81 .82 .90 .85    
       
Coping with Envy 
1. stay 
focussed 
2. hold back 3. extra 
energy 
4. control 
expression 
   
nc1 (.77) 
nc2 (.88) 
nc6 (.89) 
nc7 (.88) 
nc8 (.83) 
nc9 (.84) 
 nc10 (.93) 
nc3 (-.86) 
nc4 (-.85) 
nc5 (-.79) 
   
Reliability    
.58 .76 .86 .79    
 
Table 4. Mean differences for coping strategies 
 
 Configural Archetypesa ANOVA results 
 High emo-
tionally 
competent 
cluster  
Low emo-
tionally 
competent 
cluster 
Emotionally 
dissonant 
cluster 
Low-
irony 
cluster 
F-Statistic p-value 
Coping with Pride       
Stay focussed 
(tc1-5) 
5.70  5.29 5.60 5.23 2.90 .04 
Hold back 
(tc8-10) 
5.64 5.24 5.49 5.13 1.96 .12 
Extra energy 
(tc11-13) 
5.97b 5.23 5.37 5.31 3.98 .01 
Control 
expression 
(tc6-7) 
5.73 5.33 5.28 5.43 1.2 .31 
Coping with Envy       
Stay focussed 
(nc1-2) 
5.30c 4.32 4.94 4.59 3.79 .01 
Hold back 
(nc6-7) 
4.34 4.43 4.53 4.34 .36 .78 
Extra energy 
(nc8-10) 
5.97d 4.75 5.18 5.07 9.54 .00 
Control 
expression (3-5) 
6.38d 5.63 5.65 5.78 6.13 .00 
a  Mean values in boldface differ significantly from other mean values in the same row, results are based 
on Scheffe's contrast method (p < 0.05).  
b significant difference to clusters 2 and 4 (p< 0.05), significant difference to cluster 3 (p < 0.07). 
c significant difference to cluster 2. 
d significant difference to clusters 2, 3, and 4. 
 
 
 
 Table 5. Mean differences for performance parameters and social capital 
 
 
 Configural Archetypesa ANOVA results 
 High 
emotio-
nally 
competent 
cluster 
Low 
emotio-
nally 
competent 
cluster 
Emotio-
nally 
dissonant 
cluster 
Low-irony 
cluster 
F-Statistic p-value 
Performance       
Customer 
Relations 
6.40b 5.95 5.96 6.27b 9.28 .00 
Sales 5.34b 4.69 4.81 4.98 6.19 .00 
Social Capital       
Information Ties 6.17c 5.57 5.60 5.86 3.47 .02 
Customer 
Information 
6.26d 5.20 5.24 5.63b 17.16 .00 
Structural 
Information 
4.94d 3.84 4.07 4.27 6.80 .00 
Strategic 
Information 
5.60d 4.60 5.02 4.99 7.53 .00 
Implementation 5.74e 5.04 5.24 5.27 3.74 .01 
Trust 6.09f 5.46 5.68 5.78 5.58 .00 
a  Mean values in boldface differ significantly from other mean values in the same row, results are based 
on Scheffe's contrast method (p<0.05).  
b significant difference to clusters 2 and 3. 
c significant difference to clusters 2 and 3 (p<0.07). 
d significant difference to clusters 2, 3, and 4. 
e significant difference to cluster 2. 
f significant difference to cluster 2 (p<0.05), significant difference to cluster 3 (p<0.07). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
i Saarni’s (1999) research was conducted primarily on children and adolescents, and only partly on adults, and in 
addition dealt with general populations. We used here research as a guide to identify skills that seem particularly 
relevant to customer boundary spanners and adaptable to the work selling (e.g., Spencer & Spencer, 1993).    
ii Terminology in the literature on emotional intelligence is not consistent. Some authors use the terms emotional 
intelligence (e.g., Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Goleman, 1995), others emotional quotient (e.g., Bar-On, 1997) and 
Huy (1999) emotional capability. 
iii Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (2000) place emotional intelligence as a part of general intelligence, as such, Saarni 
(2000, p. 84) argues that “intelligence is an entity that we locate inside the person or as being traitlike in terms of 
characterizing the person according to some consistent quality.” 
iv Moral psychologists (e.g., Flanagan, 1991; Flanagan & Rorty, 1990; Dillon, 1995) also stress the connection 
between emotional competence and moral character. In this regard, Peck et al. (1960, p. 9) note this about a person 
with high moral character: “He reacts with emotion appropriate to the occasion. ... He knows himself, and faces his 
own reactions honestly. He does what is morally right because he wants to, not because it is “the thing to do.” ... 
He assesses each situation in its own terms, but follows his principles in deciding what to do. ... If he succeeds, he 
no longer feels guilty. Such a person, it was proposed in this study, is moral to the highest degree. He is also 
mature, emotionally well-adjusted, and using his constructive capacities to the fullest.” 
v It should be stressed that these seven proficiencies – in contrast to the components of emotional intelligence – are 
all skills and hence can be learned (Saarni, 1999; 2000; Huy, 1999). 
vi Although there is certainly a significant genetic contribution to empathy (e.g., Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 
1992; Rushton et al., 1986), learning processes also have a strong influence on the development of empathy (see 
Plomin et al., 1993). As Eisenberg (2000, p. 684) notes, “observation of and interactions with socializers also 
probably contribute to individual differences in empathy-related reactions, above and beyond any contributions 
made by heredity.” 
vii It be noted that Saarni (1999) uses “emotional competence” and “emotional self-efficacy”  interchangeable.    
viii The total sample consisted of 59 self-reports and manager evaluations by salespersons and managers working in 
industrial selling within Dutch companies. 71% of the respondents were male, mean work experience was at 7 
years. 30% of the salespeople were 30 years and younger, 42% were between 31 and 40 years, 15% between 41 
and 50, and 13% older than 50 years. 
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